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Abstract
World War One was a difficult time for American Mennonites. Conscription revealed profound
differences between progressive Mennonites such as those from the General Conference and
plain Mennonites such as those from the Mennonite Church. The General Conference endorsed
non-combatant service and advised its draftees to “accept only service designed to support and to
save life.” The Mennonite Church, however, categorically rejected non-combatant service and
declared that “under no circumstances can they consent to service, either combatant or noncombatant, under the military arm of the government.” Military officers and government officials
tended to view all Mennonites in a strictly adversarial fashion and usually failed to recognize or
appreciate their differences or the sincerity of their efforts to reach some sort of mutually
satisfactory compromise. Conscription defined a generation of young men and produced its fair
share of martyrs. One hundred and thirty-eight Mennonites, most of them plain, were courtmartialed for refusing to accept noncombatant service. But in a counterintuitive way,
conscription also strengthened the Mennonite Church. The young Mennonite men realized the
tension between their religious beliefs and the expectations of them as citizens of the United
States. They almost invariably reported that whatever suffering they endured because of their
nonresistant stand ultimately strengthened their faith.
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Draft Evaders and Conscientious Objectors
The United States declared war on Germany on April 6, 1917. Congress passed the
Selective Service Act six weeks later on May 18th. For just the second time in history, and the
first time since the Civil War, national conscription was once again a reality in the United States.
Conscription had been extremely divisive during the Civil War, when just eight percent of the
United States military was drafted. The public, as well as many politicians and military officers,
questioned its effectiveness and whether it had been worth the trouble. Conscription remained
controversial, and this time it impacted a far larger segment of the American public. During
World War One nearly 24 million American men were registered, more than 4 million were
selected, and 2.8 million men, including over 2,000 Mennonites were actually conscripted. This
represented 72 percent of those who served. 1
Prior to the passage of the Selective Service Act, public opinion strongly favored
voluntary “patriotic” enlistments, which were considered both more masculine and democratic
than conscription. Enoch Crowder, Judge Advocate General of the United States Army, argued in
1917 that a military draft was “not in harmony with the spirit of our people” and that “all of our
previous experience has been that it causes trouble and that our people prefer the volunteering
method.” 2 Once the Selective Service Act became law however, a new, more positive assessment
of conscription emerged. Crowder was appointed Provost Marshall and would be responsible for
drafting the Selective Service Act and implementing conscription. Like many military officers
and politicians he quickly and effortlessly transitioned from being a critic of conscription to
become one of conscriptions greatest advocates.
These “conscriptionists” were quick to dismiss any lingering concerns (and question the
loyalty) of anyone who continued to oppose conscription. Opponents of conscription were
denounced as anti-American, and accused of being pro-German. Former president Theodore
Roosevelt alleged that “the bulk of the conscientious objectors were slackers, pure and simple, or
else traitorous pro-Germans.” 3 He denounced opponents of conscription as “professional
pacifists, poltroons, and college sissies.” 4 President Wilson did nothing to improve the
perception of conscientious objectors and other pacifists when he announced “what I am opposed
to is not the feeling of the pacifist, but their stupidity. My heart is with them, but my mind has a

1
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contempt for them. I want peace, but I know how to get it, and they do not.” 5
There were no large scale anti-conscription riots in the United States during World War
One, as there had been in New York City in 1863, but support for conscription was far from
universal. Individual acts of nonviolent draft evasion were widespread. Hundreds of thousands of
men failed to register, others registered but did not report to their local boards, and still others
deserted after being inducted. When the United States declared war, neither federal, state, nor
local governments possessed the capabilities to identify or locate these evaders, though the
Federal government quickly began to build that capability. By June 30, 1918, the Justice
Department had conducted 220,747 investigations of men who had failed to register, and had
initiated 10,000 prosecutions in cases where the failure to register appeared to be “clearly
willful.” 6 These draft resisters attempted to evade the law and posed a challenge to conscription
because of their sheer numbers, but they did not directly challenge the legitimacy of the law.
Conscientious objectors, though far fewer in number, posed a greater, more existential
threat. They made no effort to evade the law, instead they registered and if inducted they reported
to the military authorities. They voluntarily placed themselves under the physical control of the
military but then refused to recognize military authority or accept military service. They claimed
the right to exemption not only for themselves, but for others like them. They directly challenged
the legitimacy of the Selective Service Act and the government’s right to compel their service. In
the process, they challenged the prevalent understanding of the rights and duties of citizenship.
Conscientious objectors were a remarkably diverse lot, and each conscientious objector’s
journey was unique, but certain men were far more likely than others to become conscientious
objectors. Some men based their objection upon political or humanitarian principles. The War
Department estimated that about 10 percent of all objectors were “political.” Most of these
“political objectors” were Socialists, but the war divided the Socialist movement and many
Socialists accepted military service. The vast majority of conscientious objectors based their
objections upon religious beliefs. Most of the religious conscientious objectors belonged to one
of the recognized historic peace churches: the Friends (Quakers), the Mennonites, and the
Brethren.
Regardless of their motives, the first step for any man who claimed conscientious
objector status was to appear before one of the 4,648 local exemption boards. The attitude of
these exemption boards towards conscientious objectors varied, though few could truly be
described as sympathetic. These local exemption boards had some discretion in granting
5
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exemptions, especially in the case of men who could base a claim upon several factors such as
dependent children or elderly parents, but the exemption for conscientious reasons was from
combatant duty only. The clear intent of the Selective Service Act was to spread the obligation
for military service broadly throughout the eligible population. If a local board was convinced
that a registrant qualified as a conscientious objector they would issue the man a certificate of
exemption on conscience grounds, Form 1008, which he would then present to military officials
when he arrived in camp, but the draftee remained liable for noncombatant duty.
Regardless of how the local board ruled, the inductee had to validate his claim again after
arriving at camp and convince skeptical military authorities of his sincerity. A total of 20,873
men made conscientious objector claims to their local boards, and were subsequently inducted
into the army. Just 3,989 of these men actually claimed conscientious objector status in camp.
Certainly the physical and mental duress and “inhuman treatment” designed to test the
“genuineness” of their convictions convinced many to drop their claim. 7 Slightly more than half
of the 3,989 men who claimed conscientious objector status in camp were Mennonites. 8 The
government did not usually distinguish between progressive, conservative, or Old Order
Mennonites, but members of the conservative and Old Order groups were much more likely to
press their claim in camp and they were more likely to refuse noncombatant service even if that
meant a court-martial and imprisonment. Thus the public face of the religious conscientious
objector in the United States was that of a plain Mennonite.

The American Mennonites and Their Experience Prior To the First World
War
The Mennonites originated in Switzerland and Germany early in the sixteenth century.
Named after Menno Simons (1496-1561), a former Catholic priest, they believed in the
separation of the church and the state, and to some extent the separation of the church from the
surrounding culture. They respected secular government but insisted that there were certain
religious matters over which secular government had no authority. They rejected the authority of
the state churches of Europe and were viewed as heretics and severely persecuted. Their early
history, chronicled in great detail in Martyrs Mirror, is full of tales of persecution and martyrs.
The Bible and Martyrs’ Mirror, first published in 1660, were fixtures in almost every Mennonite
home during World War One.
Persecutions in Europe, coupled with the promise of abundant land and a welcome
invitation from William Penn, encouraged the first Mennonite migrations to North America.
They settled in Germantown, Pennsylvania in 1683. Sizeable Mennonite communities existed in
Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia prior to the American Revolution. Ervin Stutzman notes
7
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that these immigrants subscribed to a two-kingdom theology, and perceived themselves as
belonging to God’s kingdom first. Members of the church were strictly prohibited from
participating in warfare, but that was just the beginning of their pacifism. They subscribed to the
doctrine of defenselessness or nonresistance, the belief that it was wrong to use force against
others even in the case of self-defense. Stutzman describes nonresistance as a “logical extension
of two-kingdom theology and the doctrine of nonconformity.” He notes that nonresistance was a
“defining feature of Mennonite theology and practice.” 9
Practicing nonresistance while also respecting civil authorities requires a delicate balance
under the best of circumstances, and it becomes even more challenging during times of war. Both
the French and Indian War and the Revolutionary War tested the North American Mennonite
communities, but an even greater, more sustained test of their nonresistance beliefs occurred
during the Civil War. The Enrollment Act, which became law on March 3, 1863, was the first
national draft in United States history. All male citizens between the ages of 20 and 45 as well as
all male immigrants who had taken out naturalization papers were required to register. Many
Mennonites accepted noncombat work, often in hospitals, while others took advantage of a
provision in the Enrollment Act which allowed them to hire a substitute or pay a commutation
fee. 10 The Civil War experience left a deep impression on all of the historic peace churches and
resulted in a good deal of self-reflection and self-criticism. Many Mennonites felt that hiring a
substitute to go to war in their place was no different than going to war themselves, but the
computation fee, which was pledged for “the benefit of the sick and wounded soldiers” and more
importantly was construed as a tax, was generally viewed as acceptable. 11
The Spanish-American War was fought entirely by volunteers, and the Universal Military
Service Act in 1903 specifically exempted members of religious organizations opposed to war so
nonresistant people had plenty of time—52 years from the end of the Civil War to the passage of
the Selective Service Act—to consider their position regarding conscription.

The Mennonite Church (Plain) and General Conference (Progressive)
On the eve of the First World War there were more than a dozen Mennonite sects in the
United States. The Mennonite Church (MC)—sometimes familiarly called the (Old) Mennonite
Church—and the General Conference Mennonite Church (General Conference) were the two
largest Mennonite bodies in the United States. Together they accounted for over half of all
Mennonites living in the United States during World War I.

9
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Most (Old) Mennonites were descendants from immigrants who had come some 150
years earlier from Switzerland and the Palatinate. Though they had a much longer history in the
United States, most (Old) Mennonites were less assimilated and far more conservative than most
General Conference churches. Members of the Mennonite Church were more likely to speak
German, especially at home, though most were also fluent in English. The Mennonite Church
was also stricter in regard to the doctrine of nonconformity, which was enforced when necessary
by denying the offender the right to participate in communion. The (Old) Mennonite Church,
with 34,965 members, was the largest Mennonite group in the United Stated during the First
World War. 12
The General Conference of the Mennonites in North America (General Conference) was
formed in 1860 when a group of progressive churches that had earlier broken from the Franconia
conference merged with a group of Iowa churches. They sought “a more outward-looking
Mennonite church” and hoped to unify all North American Mennonites, but the (Old)
Mennonites had a very different view of the world and had little interest in joining them. 13 The
General Conference emphasized progress and rational thinking. They emphasized higher
education, embraced missions and Sunday schools, and championed the church’s role in
improving society. At the turn of the twentieth century they were more optimistic about the
prospects for world peace. 14
The General Conference might have remained a relatively obscure conference were it not
for a large influx of ethnic German immigrants from Russia, who migrated to the United States
in the 1870’s. Most of these immigrants settled in Kansas, Nebraska, and Oklahoma and
affiliated with the General Conference. 15 The General Conference Mennonite Church had 15,407
members in 1916. 16
The Mennonite Church was the largest of the plain Mennonites while the General
Conference was the largest of the progressive Mennonites. Ervin Stutzman notes that the two
groups had “little social interaction or knowledge of each other.” Part of this is due to difference
in ethnicity and national origins, but there was also considerable difference between them in the
importance that they placed upon the practice of nonconformity with the world. The Selective
Service Act revealed that there was also considerable difference in their understanding of
nonresistance. Stutzman points to John Horsch and Guy Hershberger as early leaders of the
Mennonite Church who “articulated the clear distinction between worldly pacifism and biblical
12
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nonresistance.” He argues that none of the early General Conference leaders made such a clear
distinction. Stutzman also notes that Mennonite Church congregations were much more
consistent in expelling men who served in the military than General Conference churches which
rarely applied this form of church discipline. 17 There are several reasons for this difference in
their application of nonresistance to the challenge of conscription. The most significant factor,
however, is the fundamentally different approach of the plain and the progressive traditions to
the practice of nonconformity with the world.
The (Old) Mennonite Church organized under a central conference, the Mennonite
General Conference, in 1898 and met biennially until 1971. The Mennonite General Conference
was strictly an advisory body and church authority continued to reside in the independent district
conferences. Despite this complicated structure and the absence of any binding authority, the
pronouncements of the Mennonite General Conference on matters of faith carried great weight
and had tremendous influence upon the various district conferences, which comprised the
Mennonite Church. 18
James C. Juhnke notes that by 1914 the (Old) Mennonite Church had achieved “more
organizational solidarity and uniformity” than the General Conference had. Juhnke notes that
“effective authority” in the (Old) Mennonite Church, rested with the bishops who “ran the
various (and much older) district conferences, and established and enforced rules for church
procedures and personal styles of life.” Juhnke argues that the World War would “show how
successfully the (Old) Mennonites’ general conference might set standards for bishops to enforce
at the district and local level.” He notes, for example, that the conference adopted a strong
statement against taking part in “carnal warfare” in 1915 at Archbold, Ohio. Members who “bore
arms” were to be “disowned from membership.” Two years later, at the Yellow Creek church in
northern Indiana, the conference adopted “the most comprehensive statement on military service
made by any Mennonite group during the war.” 19
The war which broke out in Europe in 1914 was troubling to all American Mennonites,
but for nearly three years it was also distant. So long as the United States remained neutral, there
was no immediate problem. Allan Teichroew argues that “Mennonites were an isolated people in
World War I. The average Mennonite, General Conference, (Old) Mennonite, Amish, or other,
paid scant attention to the problems created by the failure of international diplomacy.” 20
However, the Declaration of War, followed closely by the Selective Service Act, was devastating.
The factious nature of the Mennonite community, divided into many competing and
17
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jealous sects, did not serve any of them particularly well when they were confronted with
conscription in 1917. It made it difficult to speak with one voice and almost impossible for them
to effectively reach out to other peace churches or secular peace organizations to present a united
front to the government. As a result, there was a lot of duplicated effort, as numerous Mennonite
sects sent delegations to Washington, D.C., seeking information and promises that their members
would be exempted from compulsory military service. This was also frustrating to government
officials, as some Mennonite groups eventually relaxed their opposition to noncombatant service.
The General Conference, Mennonite Brethren, and Krimmer Mennonite Brethren all indicated
that they would accept “service in agricultural or the Red Cross and failing that, might even
agree to do non-combatant work.” Melanie Mock points out in Writing Peace: The Unheard
Voices of Great War Mennonite Objectors that these offers of service “contradicted the position
of other groups. (Old) Mennonites took a firmer stance in their discussions with government
authorities, rejecting any form of duty under military government, combatant or noncombatant.” 21
This lack of unity was especially detrimental to the Mennonite Church and other plain
Mennonites. It hindered their efforts to introduce themselves and explain their beliefs to
government officials and to the broader American public. This lack of unity allowed their image
to be controlled by military officials who were inherently skeptical of conscientious objectors
and by critics who were less than sympathetic. This is not to say that a united effort to educate
the public and selective service officials would have made much of a difference. The positions of
the Mennonite Church and the government relative to conscription were quite far apart. This lack
of agreement and coordination, however, did not help the situation. Government officials can
perhaps be forgiven for their failure to comprehend why plain Mennonites continued to refuse
noncombatant service when others, in particular the General Conference, had agreed to accept it.
This lack of unity was the result of significant differences in outlook and not from a lack of
effort.
I. A. Sommer, editor of The Mennonite, the official English language organ of the
General Conference, posed a provocative question in a 1910 editorial: “In What Fundamentals
Do Mennonites Agree?” This editorial led to the first All-Mennonite Convention held at Berne,
Indiana in 1910. Eight other All-Mennonite Conventions were held irregularly thereafter until
1936. None of these conventions were held while the United States was at war and only the
second convention, held at Carlock, Illinois, August 30-31, 1916 occurred during World War
One.
The Second All-Mennonite Convention appointed a committee to speak for Mennonites
collectively, but James C. Juhnke notes that this was “an ad hoc voice.” He points out that “it did
not speak for the Old Order Amish and Old Order Mennonites, who had ignored the misnamed
‘All Mennonite’ movement.” Nor did it “speak for the much larger Amish Mennonite and ‘Old’
21
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Mennonite bodies, for they had specifically opposed the convention.” 22 At the conclusion of the
convention, the delegates sent a petition to President Woodrow Wilson expressing their
conviction “that war can never serve as an effective solution to international complications” and
that “arbitration and other conciliatory methods, rather than military force, should be encouraged
as a far better instrument for the securing of international justice.” 23 Although this statement was
issued by the more progressive Mennonites, the plain Mennonites certainly agreed with the
sentiment. There was, however, considerable disagreement between the progressive and the plain
churches over the likelihood that arbitration would work and how to respond in the event that it
failed.

The Selective Service Act and Mennonites on Military Service
The Selective Service Act became effective on May 18, 1917. It provided exemptions for
… well-recognized religious sects or organizations at present organized and existing and
whose existing creed or principles forbid its members to participate in war in any form
and whose religious convictions are against war or participation therein in accordance
with the creed or principles of said religious organizations, but no person so exempted
shall be exempted from service in any capacity that the President shall declare to be noncombatant. 24
Mennonites certainly qualified as members of well-recognized religious sects. However, a period
of uncertainty followed as regulations governing exemptions and defining non-combatant service
were drafted.
Registration Day was held on June 5, 1917. Although the president had not yet defined
what constituted non-combatant service, Allan Teichroew explains that Registration Day
“brought no difficulty from any Mennonites” because “none of the Mennonite groups opposed
registration on principle.” He adds that the Exemption Committee of the General Conference
considered “registration to be as innocuous as a census” while the official organ of the
Mennonite Church, the Gospel Herald, reasoned that “to obey it was in accord with the Biblical
teaching which taught that Christians should be subject to the powers that be.” The Gospel
Herald added that it provided “an opportunity to make an important public witness on the issue
of nonresistance.” 25
Having avoided the first two All-Mennonite Conventions, which were sponsored by the
22
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General Conference, 199 delegates representing sixteen district conferences of the (Old)
Mennonite Church from the United States, Canada, and India met at the Yellow Creek Church
near Goshen, Indiana, on August 29, 1917 to address war related issues. The Yellow Creek
conference, which was held nearly two months after registration day, was not as timely as the
first two All-Mennonite Conventions but it took two very significant actions. First, it selected
Bishop Aaron Loucks, to head the Military Problems Committee. Loucks would be a vigorous
and effective advocate in representing the Mennonite Church in its interactions with the
government and the public. 26 Equally as important, the delegates issued a statement at the
conclusion of the conference which represented a clear “expression of our position on the
doctrine of nonresistance as applied to present condition brought on by the world war now
raging.” This statement, Mennonites on Military Service—sometimes referred to as the Yellow
Creek statement—was much more direct and confrontational than the Petition from the AllMennonite Convention, which had been issued the previous year. A number of factor explain the
difference in tone between the two documents, not the least of which was the fact that the
Mennonites on Military Service, represented the views of the plain (Old) Mennonite Church. The
fact that the United States was now a belligerent, and no longer neutral, was also significant.
Mennonites on Military Service began by stating that “we hold that Christian people
should have no part in carnal warfare of any kind or for any cause.” The statement claimed
protection offered under “Selective Draft Law enacted May 18, 1917,” noting that they were one
of the churches “whose existing creed or principles forbid its members to participate in war in
any form and whose religious convictions are against war or participation therein.” The
statement expressed deep regret, however, that the exemption was “practically nullified (save in
the matter of bearing arms)” by the “further provision empowering the government to impress
non-resistant people into noncombatant service.” 27
Mennonites on Military Service then restated their Confession of Faith adopted at
Dortrecht, Holland in 1632 noting that
… this position has been uniformly held by our forefathers from Reformation times and
their loyalty and devotion to their faith is attested by their suffering, even to the extent of
martyrdom and banishment by those governments enjoining military service upon their
citizens.
It admitted an apparent tension in their doctrine that
even laws which may seem unwise and unjust should be submitted to uncomplainingly
26
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and no thought should be entertained of doing anything but comply with all that they ask
of us – unless they prescribe conditions contrary to the Gospel; in which case we should
meekly but faithfully stand true to the principles of the Gospel, even if the consequences
entail suffering.
It pointed out that “this position has been exemplified by the apostles (Acts 5:29) and our early
church fathers.” 28
Mennonites on Military Service acknowledged “Past Favors” and rejoiced “that freedom
of conscience is thus recognized by the laws of our land.” It noted that “We still have among us
brethren who suffered for conscience’s sake” during the Civil War. These brethren “recall with
much gratitude the freedom from military service which that exemption secured for them.” It
expressed “hope that when the powers that be fully understand our position with reference to
military service” that the clause in the Selective Draft Law pertaining to noncombatant service
might be “accordingly modified.” They very clearly stated their difficulty with noncombatant
service:
… as a Christian people we have always endeavored to support the government under
which we lived in every capacity consistent with the teaching of the Gospel as we
understand it, and will continue to do so; but according to this teaching we cannot
participate in war in any form; that is, to aid or abet war, whether in a combatant or noncombatant capacity. 29
The delegates who attached their signatures to Mennonites on Military Service were quite
aware of the potential consequences of their position. The delegates addressed what would
become a frequent perception, that
... no one who really understands our position will accuse us of either disloyalty or
cowardice; for our record had proven our submissiveness to the powers that be, and to
maintain our position under present conditions requires greater courage than to accept
non-combatant service.
Mennonites on Military Service included a direct appeal to the President of the United
States “and all others in authority to bear with us in this attitude and not to construe our position
as a lack of appreciation for past favors or as an act of disloyalty; also to grant unto us full liberty
of conscience and the free exercise of our faith.” 30
Mennonites on Military Service concluded with some direct recommendations “To Our
Brethren Liable for Military Service.” Specifically these brethren were advised to “comply with
every requirement of the government” while “availing themselves of every opportunity to
28
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present their claims for exemption.” They were instructed to exercise care not to “commit any
acts that could be rightfully interpreted as desertion or treason.” When summoned to enter the
military service, they were instructed to
present themselves to the authority and meekly inform them that under no circumstances
can they consent to service, either combatant or non-combatant, under the military arm of
the government, citing them to the fact that they are members of a church whose creed
and principles forbid them to have part in war in any form, and their consciences coincide
with this position.
Finally, they were instructed to submit “to any penalty the government may see fit to inflict,
trusting the Lord for guidance and protection.” 31
James C. Juhnke notes that the (Old) Mennonite’s General Conference was “only an
advisory body whose counsel the district conferences, some of whom were not even members,
could choose to ignore.” He argues that by attaching their names to the document the Mennonite
Church “committed its leaders and district conferences much more deeply than it could have
done merely by declaring a conference position.” 32 Given that there was some uncertainty over
how the government would eventually define non-combatant service, the fact that the 199
delegates signed the statement is a remarkable testament to a unity of vision and demonstrates
the consensus within the Mennonite Church on the doctrine of nonresistance. 33
Mennonites on Military Service was typical, if perhaps slightly more confrontational, of
the statements issued by other peace churches. It clearly articulated the long standing doctrine of
the Mennonite Church while being very carefully worded to stay, as much as possible, within the
spirit and letter of the law. Nevertheless, Mennonites on Military Service was not received well
by certain members of the government and military.
R.H. Van Deman, chief of the military intelligence branch, wrote to A. Bruce Bielaski,
chief of the bureau of investigation, Department of Justice, on April 12, 1918 to report that he
had received and studied a copy of Mennonites on Military Service. He drew special attention to
the recommendation that “under no circumstances can they [members of the church] consent to
the military service, either combatant or non-combatant, under the military arm of the
government.” He also noted that
... the list of Church heads and officials appear to be largely German or of German
31
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extraction. It would seem that this resistance to the very liberal provisions of the
“Selective Draft Law” regarding conscientious objectors is a very insidious piece of proGerman propaganda.
Van Deman suggested that an “investigation of the Mennonites and their activities might bring to
light interesting revelations.” Military officials were often not capable, or interested, in
differentiating between plain and progressive groups, and tended not to notice the considerable
differences between them. In this case though, it is clear that Van Deman is referring specifically
to the Mennonite Church. 34
Van Deman would remain suspicion of the Mennonites and their motives throughout the
war. This suspicion was widespread among military officers, government officials, and the
general public. Incessant government propaganda, intended to create support for the war,
conditioned the public to question the patriotism and even the loyalty of anyone who dissented in
even minor ways, and opposition to conscription was no minor point of disagreement and
dissent.
S.C. Yoder, of Kalona, Iowa, was one of the 199 bishops, ministers, deacons, lay
delegates and representatives of the Mennonite Church that had signed Mennonites on Military
Service. He wrote to Aaron Loucks on Sept. 2, 1918 after he learned that Loucks had “been in
communication with the Dept. of Justice, with reference to the prospective prosecution of the
Ministers and Bishops who signed [Mennonites on Military Service].” Yoder wanted to find out
“what the prospects are of getting into the penitentiary on that score.” He reported that “all the
Iowa ministers who have signed the document were called before Special Agent Sherwood, at
Washington, Iowa, Saturday and a number of questions asked and statements taken.” Yoder noted
that Dr. Stone “is at the head of the movement to imprison all who had signed it.” Yoder
described Stone as “one of the worst trouble makers that I have known. 35
Yoder had good reason to be concerned. In addition to the enforcement provisions
contained in the Selective Service Act of 1917, a number of other pieces of wartime legislation—
most notably the Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, the Trading with the Enemy Act of October 6,
1917, the Sabotage Act of April 20, 1918, and the Sedition Act of May 16, 1918—gave the
government extraordinary powers, certainly greater than it had exercised at any time since the
Civil War, to compel compliance with wartime policies. It was no secret that the Justice
Department considered bringing charges, under the Espionage Act, against the Mennonite leaders
who had signed Mennonites on Military Service. Indictments were prepared but ultimately none
of these cases were actually prosecuted. A handful of Mennonite leaders were, however, tried for
34
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other offences closely related to their criticism of the war. The two most notable cases were that
of Samuel H. Miller of Sugarcreek, Ohio, and that of Lewis J. Heatwole of Randolph County,
West Virginia. Both cases resulted in convictions.
A comprehensive and impartial investigation of the Mennonites and their activities would
surely have revealed some interesting revelations, but perhaps not the revelations that Van
Deman expected. Because Van Deman and other military officers and government officials
tended to view Mennonites in this strictly adversarial fashion, they usually failed to recognize or
appreciate the sincerity of their efforts to reach some sort of mutually satisfactory compromise.

Efforts to Find Alternative Forms of Service
On September 15, 1917, Secretary of War Baker ordered camp commanders to hold
conscientious objectors—then estimated to be between 1,800 to 2,000 men—segregated, pending
further disposition of their cases. He explicitly forbade any “punitive hardship” be inflicted upon
them. On October 10, 1917, Baker issued a second confidential order which directed that
draftees who refused to participate in drills were to be segregated to keep their ideas from
spreading to the rest of the camp. This order specified that efforts were to be made to convince
them to accept military service, but it did not clarify what steps officers could or should use,
though it did specify that the attitude of conscientious objectors be “quietly ignored” and that
they be treated with “kindly consideration.” 36
Efforts by the War Department to keep many of the policies concerning conscientious
objectors secret, so as to discourage more men from coming forward with objections, resulted in
a very inefficient system for relaying orders and unintentionally contributed to an environment of
uncertainty that led to abuses. Lacking specific guidelines, and with innumerable other pressing
concerns, camp commanders never considered conscientious objectors a high priority. Most of
them seemed content not to take an active interest in the conscientious objectors while others
were willfully ignorant of the physical, mental, and psychological coercion that was inflicted
upon the objectors, usually by fellow soldiers or non-commissioned officers. Often this coercion
amounted to abuse. Occasionally this abuse was severe and prolonged and amounted to torture.
The rapid turnover of both officers and conscientious objectors made it difficult not only to relay
orders promptly but also to monitor the treatment of conscientious objectors in the various
military cantonments. Oversight was poor, and the War Department often learned of abuse from
representatives of the historic peace churches or civil liberties organizations.
One possible solution to this problem would have been to furlough these absolutists and
allow them to fulfill their non-combatant service under civilian oversight. A proposal suggesting
this approach was circulated throughout the War Department as early as 1917, but Provost
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General Crowder displayed his capacity for counterintuitive reasoning and made the highly
legalistic objection that the Conscription Act had authorized the President to assign inductees to
non-combatant service only in “the military establishment” and did not authorize him to
conscript men for civilian service. 37 Conscripting men for civilian service would have been
acceptable to the vast majority of conscientious objectors, but likely would have been unpopular
with the general public, which was not in favor of any compromise. Crowder’s opposition to this
proposal, which was never a realistic option politically, dashed any hope for a quick solution to
the conscientious objector problem. The idea, however, would survive and it would form the
basic approach toward conscientious objectors that the United States followed during the Second
World War.
The failure to reach an accommodation regarding alternative service meant that
Mennonites men, like everyone else, would have a legal obligation to report to military camps if
they were called by their local exemption board. Some boards recognized that it was good policy
to keep conscientious objectors, who often were highly productive farmers, on the farms where
they were making valuable though indirect contributions to the war effort than to send them to
military camps where at best they would be a nuisance. They used what discretionary powers
were available to them to keep conscientious objectors out of the military, but most boards were
insistent on sending even the most adamant objectors into the military. The fact that Mennonites
were geographically concentrated into a relative small number of the 4,648 local exemption
districts guaranteed that even sympathetic exemption boards would send a large number of
Mennonite conscientious objectors into military service.

The Experience in the Camps
The first conscientious objectors reported to military camps in late summer of 1917. They
faced the most uncertainty. Later draftees benefited from their experience and left home with a
greater familiarity with military procedures, but circumstances were slightly different at every
camp and procedures changed over time, so to some extent each conscientious objector faced an
unfamiliar, though generally hostile, environment. All objectors, but especially the earlier
objectors, were “placed in an unenviable position, uncertain of what the government would ask
of them and uncertain too what the church expected of them.” 38 Their diaries reveal their
“profound sense of isolation and alienation, from their ethnic communities and from the
communities in which they were forced to live, communities that reviled them for not
wholeheartedly embracing the country’s militaristic fervor.” 39 Their decisions in camp revealed
profound differences between progressive Mennonites such as those from the General
Conference and plain Mennonites such as those from the Mennonite Church. This was
particularly evident when it came to their attitudes toward non-combatant service.
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Gerlof Homan writes in American Mennonites in the Great War that one of the first
“supposedly definitive statements of action” made by a Mennonite group was that of the General
Conference, whose Exemption Committee advised its draftees in September 1917 to “accept
only service designed to support and to save life. They were not to participate in any work that
would result in personal injury.” 40 This statement was far from definitive, and not very specific,
but it clearly endorsed, at least in principle, accepting non-combatant service. The contrast with
the Mennonite Church’s position, as articulated in Mennonites on Military Service, that “under
no circumstances can they consent to service, either combatant or non-combatant, under the
military arm of the government” could not have been clearer. 41 The plain Mennonite Church’s
position represented a categorical rejection of non-combatant service.
When a conscientious objector arrived in camp, he faced a dizzying number of decisions.
Even if he was determined to refuse non-combatant service, it was not always obvious exactly
where to draw the line. The consequences of every decision were enormous. This was true for all
conscientious objectors regardless of the reason for their objections.
Aaron Loucks and the Military Problems Committee performed an important, though
controversial, role as an intermediary between the government and the individual draft eligible
Mennonites. They offered conscientious objectors, as well as potential conscientious objectors,
advice on a number of topics from migrating to Canada to accepting or declining noncombat
service. Any one of these topics put them at risk for legal prosecution. Loucks, because of his
prominent role on the Military Problems Committee and the massive volume of inquiries he
received from conscripted young men and their families, was perhaps uniquely vulnerable. He
was clearly cognizant of the fact that his letters were being monitored and his every word was
being closely scrutinized; however, he continued to offer advice which, at least on occasion,
could have resulted in his prosecution and conviction.
One of the most common questions regarded the issue of wearing military uniforms.
Most resisted the uniform, though nearly all report intense pressure to wear it. Many report that
their civilian clothes were taken away, either through physical force or by subterfuge, and others
report groups of soldiers physically forcing the military uniform upon them. Wilfred Gingerich
Co. C. 156 Inf. Camp Beauregard, Alexandria Louisiana wrote to Aaron Loucks on June 10,
1918. Gingerich reported that he had been “compelled to put on a uniform and to drill.” He
added that, so far as he could tell, he was the only Mennonite in camp. He admitted that “they
have me here in such a way that I don’t know what to do.” He wrote that he would “go to
headquarters here at Camp and see what they would say” but that he could not “leave this street
without the permission of the Lieut., who is doing all he can to make me drill and to keep me in
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the drilling.” 42
Interestingly, Gingerich wrote a second letter to Loucks that same day. He began this
second letter by admitting that “I know I am a long way from Iowa, but am in great need of some
advice.” He wrote that he has been in camp “three weeks next Saturday” and he is “in a uniform
and drilling every day.” He noted that he wrote to “several ministers two weeks ago for advise
but haven’t heard from them yet.” Later he wrote that “they forced me into the uniform here, but
haven’t given us guns yet.” He claimed that he “was thinking of refusing to carry one but wanted
to hear from some ministers first as I haven’t received any advice at all.” 43
Another area of concern was the matter of military pay. Like the uniform, this was not as
simple a decision as it might at first seem. Ironically, had President Wilson’s initial intentions
been implemented, this would not have been an issue for conscientious objectors. Originally, the
Wilson administration, “influenced by conscriptionists organizations and the General Staff,” had
proposed that “wartime citizen soldiers should serve out of patriotic duty, and therefore, need not
be compensated with wages in addition to their sustenance.” Congress quickly rejected this
proposal and instead doubled the current pay for soldiers. Privates in the United States army
received $30 a month, along with allotments for dependents and War Risk Insurance. 44
J.S. Shoemaker, of Dakota, Illinois, Secretary of the Mennonite Board of Missions and
Charities (Mennonite Church), wrote to Loucks on August 5, 1918 seeking Loucks’ “opinion as
to what our Boys should do relative to accepting pay from the Government while in Camp.”
Shoemaker pointed out that presently there were “13 boys in Camp Grant.” These boys were
segregated in tents and “none of them have accepted service of any kind” but Shoemaker notes
that they were “offered the regular monthly pay.” None of the boys had accepted this offer, but
“the officers are becoming insistent that they either accept the pay, or tell them what they shall
do with it.” Shoemaker reported that the officers told the boys that “they have no right to use it
for any purpose, unless the boys say what shall be done with the money.” He reported that “the
boys are anxious to know what they shall do about the matter, whether they shall accept the pay,
or direct that the same be turned to some other purpose.” Shoemaker readily conceded that he
was “at a loss to know what instruction to give them.” He added that the problem was especially
puzzling as the boys “not having accepted any service, either combatant or non-combatant” were
42
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“not serving the Government.” Hence, in his opinion they were “not entitled to any pay, but on
the other hand they are kept in Camp, and not permitted to get out on farms and earn something,
and their time is worth more than the regular army salary, hence looking at it in that light they
would be entitled to receiving pay.” Shoemaker concluded by noting that “a few of our boys are
poor and would need the pay very much.” 45
J.S. Hartzler, who frequently answered Loucks correspondences, replied to Shoemaker
two days later, on August 7, 1918. He advised that “the boys will be the clearest in the end if they
do not accept any pay.” Hartzler suggested that
The officer’s suggestion is but a trap. They cannot get the money from Washington if the
boys do not sign up for it. That has been tested out at Taylor. It looks in this case as if the
officers wanted something to laugh up their sleeves about, or had gotten the money in
some roundabout way and must produce receipts for it, and if the boys do not accept, they
cannot do it.
Hartzler added another reason to refuse the pay, namely that “the War Department would
not allow it to be given to anything except the Red Cross, Y.M.C.A. work, W.S.S., or something
of that kind, and we are falling over each other trying to escape all these war measures.” Hartzler
repeated “for me, absolutely I cannot advice the boys to accept, and much less could I advise
them to order it given to some of these war measures.” He did concede, however, that “this may
seem needlessly stiff. I will not send it without Bro. Loucks’ ‘Jack Robinson.’ He may have
something better to offer.” Hartzler concludes with the somber warning that “cords are being
drawn a little closer all the time, and it looks as if more suffering on the part of the Church was
near at hand.” As an illustration he noted that “I was chased out of Camp Gordon, very gently,
but several others were handled a good deal rougher than I, and were threatened with
imprisonment if they ever came back, and they were there to see their own sons.” 46
Collectively, the bishops and other leaders of the Mennonite Church gave great
encouragement to their young men, many of whom had never been away from home before, who
were facing severe challenges. They exerted tremendous influence upon those young men who
might be wavering. Try as they might, however, Mennonite ministers could not be at every camp
as often as they would have liked. When Mennonite ministers were not available, military
officers arranged for YMCA ministers to speak. From all indications, the plain Mennonite
conscientious objectors resented this rather transparent attempt at propagandizing. The YMCA
ministers routinely “voiced the country’s then-predominating theology of trench salvation and
holy war.” One plain Mennonite conscientious objector, Ura Hostetler, recorded in his diary that
45
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“some civilian Anti Christ was here and talked to us something awful. May God show him the
light before it is to late…… Claimed to be a minister of the gospel.” 47

The Furlough Act and Non-Combatant Service Defined
Immediately after the United States declared war, the Department of Agriculture, joined
later by the Food Administration, began to mobilize America farmers. They stressed the
importance of the American farmer and their “big war job.” The rhetorical connection between
the “patriots on the farms” and the soldier became increasingly overt as the war continued. A
series of food production campaigns urged farmers to “go over the top” for great harvests. This
created a natural tension between maximizing agricultural production and filling the ranks of the
military.
Congress responded to this tension and passed the Furlough Act on March 16, 1918,
which authorized the Secretary of War to grant furloughs to enlisted men to “engage in civil
occupations and pursuits.” The intent of Congress was to alleviate the shortage of agricultural
labor that threatened the harvest, not to solve the problem of conscientious objectors. However,
advocates for conscientious objectors quickly pointed out the absurdity of keeping conscientious
objectors, who refused to accept any work in the military, from productive work in the civilian
economy. The Farm Furlough Bill opened the door for alternative service and hundreds of
conscientious objectors were eventually furloughed to work on farms, but the military only
began to accept requests from conscientious objectors on May 31, 1918 after Crowder had
advised the Secretary of War that the law also “allowed” conscientious objectors to be
furloughed. 48
The Furlough Act eventually solved many of the government’s conscientious objector
problems, and it provided an important precedent that was later applied during World War II with
even greater success. A committee of nine, composed of three representatives from each of the
historic peace churches, was created to assist the government in placing conscientious objectors
in civilian jobs. Although Aaron Loucks would have been a logical choice to serve on this
committee, he was deliberately left off. This was mostly, perhaps entirely, because Third
Assistant Secretary of War Frederick P. Keppel viewed Loucks not as a partner but as an
adversary. 49
Four days after Congress passed the Furlough Act, President Wilson finally defined noncombatant service on March 20, 1918. Service with the medical corps, the quartermaster corps,
and the army engineers were all designated “non-combatant.” This long-anticipated
announcement paved the way for the military to institute court-martial proceedings against those
47
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conscientious objectors who continued to refuse to accept non-combatant service. It also touched
on a debate within the Mennonite Church over how to instruct their men in the army.
Surprisingly, the Mennonite Church altered its stance, however slightly, and now
“encouraged men to accept some chores within the camps.” While not abandoning its official
position, it recognized the reality that harsher trials likely awaited those men who continued to
refuse, and, as Gerlof Homan notes, “committee members also were proceeding with more
caution because of concern that their recommendations to objectors might violate the Espionage
and Sedition Acts.” Homan specifically cites Loucks and Hartzler who not only “told Mennonite
men they should not openly refuse officers’ demands” but that they need also “explain ‘mildly’
why they found an order unacceptable.” Loucks and Hartzler decided that conscientious
objectors could “clean up around the barracks and cook, for in rejecting even these jobs men
were bringing trials upon themselves.” They could even choose to wear a uniform if they wished.
They still believed that Mennonites might have to endure suffering for their beliefs, but they
were confident that “suffering for Christ would be an opportunity to glorify God more than they
could possibly do at home or anywhere else.” Homan notes that with this evolution in
recommendations, the (Old) Mennonites “came more into line with General Conference
Mennonites who, even after Wilson’s edict, predominately believed their men could render some
service and even wear the uniform, if their conscience allowed it.” 50 Over half of the
conscientious objectors who had previously refused regular service found the President’s
definition of non-combatant service acceptable. Most of them went to work in the medical or
quartermasters corps.
Just as Loucks and Hartzler had predicted, on April 27, 1918, one month after defining
non-combatant service, Secretary Baker reversed his earlier orders that the attitude of
conscientious objectors be “quietly ignored” and declared that “sullen or defiant” objectors as
well as those whose sincerity was questionable or that engaged in “nonresistant propaganda”
would now be subject to penalties under the Articles of War and could be tried by courtmartial. 51 Many within the military felt that this option was long overdue. The General Staff
noted:
Efforts have been made to extend tolerance to those who have genuine religious
convictions against war, by offering them non combatant service, such as the Quakers
have been usually willing to perform. But there have been numbers of drafted men who
have refused to wear the uniform at all or to obey any commands. If they were not dealt
with rigorously the whole principle of universal service would fall to the ground. It has
gone hard with those who have been led to reject the Government’s tender of peaceful
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tasks. 52
With the Furlough Act passed, non-combatant service finally defined, and the War
Department’s decision to proceed with court-martials against some conscientious objectors, the
situation for conscientious objectors in the military camps began to change rapidly.

The Board of Inquiry
The War Department created a Special Board of Inquiry to interview the objectors to
determine their sincerity and then make a decision regarding their eligibility for a furlough. This
Special Board of Inquiry was chaired by Major Richard C. Stoddard of the Judge Advocate
General’s Department until he was called to duty overseas in August, after which it was chaired
by Major Walter Kellogg. 53 This procedure was generally acceptable to most conscientious
objectors, and by nearly all religious conscientious objectors, though there were a few political
conscientious objectors who strenuously objected.
Kellogg readily admitted that prior to serving on the Board he had “never set eyes on a
conscientious objector,” but “firmly believed that they were, as a class, shirkers and cowards.”
Kellogg’s opinion gradually changed as he examined over eight hundred objector in twenty
different military camps. He eventually came to believe that as a rule they were “sincere” and
neither cowards nor shirkers, at least not “in the commonly accepted sense.” He explained,
however, that their sincerity “makes them no less a national problem.” 54
While Kellogg generally judged Mennonites to be sincere and thus eligible for furlough,
he was not impressed by them. Kellogg describes a “typical” Mennonite: “He shuffles
awkwardly into the room – he seems only half awake. His features are heavy, dull, and almost
bovine.” 55 He does not specify which group of Mennonites he is referring to as “typical” but
most of the Mennonites who would have refused to accept non-combatant service—and thus
appeared before the Board of Inquiry—would have been plain Mennonites.
Kellogg concluded that Mennonites were not only “ignorant” but also so “intellectually
inferior” that they were “unworthy” of being American citizens. He wrote:
I doubt extremely if fifty per cent of the Mennonites examined, because of their
ignorance and stupidity, ever should have been admitted into the Army at all; I am certain
that ninety per cent of them need a far better preparation for citizenship than they have
ever received…. They are, doubtless, according to their lights, good Christians, but they
52
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are essentially a type of American of which America cannot be proud.” 56
The Special Board of Inquiry ultimately used a straight forward, if somewhat simple,
criterion to determine a conscientious objectors’ sincerity. Membership in a recognized church
prior to April 6, 1917 was considered a sure indication of sincerity. Those who joined after that
date were determined to be insincere. Men who were judged to be sincere were offered furloughs
for civilian work, and they and the country were spared the unnecessary burden of court-martial.
Most of these conscientious objectors were furloughed to work on farms. Many were sent to
Iowa, South Dakota, or Kansas, where there was a particularly acute labor shortage during
harvest season. In exceptional cases, the Board of Inquiry furloughed conscientious objectors, 99
in all, for service in France with the Friends Reconstruction Unit. 57
Though the Special Board of Inquiry was far from perfect, and had its critics both within
the military establishment and among the conscientious objectors, it was a significant step
toward a better policy that served the needs of both the conscientious objectors and the nation.
Harlan Stone, a member of the Special Board of Inquiry who would later became the Chief
Justice of the United States Supreme Court, reflected in 1919 on the evolving treatment of
conscientious objectors. Stone wrote that
... if unhappily we should again find ourselves in an armed conflict, the record of our
experience with the conscientious objector, and especially the common-sense
interpretation of it, will be found to be of value not only to the military authorities but to
the public at large. 58
Regardless of the generally skeptical attitude of many in the military, the Farm Furlough
program went forward and, as the only real alternative to court-martials, it did a great deal of
good in reducing “the problem” of the conscientious objector. Although there were some aspects
of the program that raised concerns, most Mennonites, including the Mennonite Church,
generally had a very favorable view of the Farm Furlough Program. Although Aaron Loucks was
not a member of the Committee created to advise the War Department on the Farm Furlough
program, his efforts in matching conscientious objectors with eligible farmers for furloughs were
perhaps his most beneficial service to the government.
Loucks explained the church’s eagerness to cooperate with the government in arranging
furloughs in a letter to A.H. Rhodes of Columbiana, Ohio. “Our purpose” Loucks wrote, “is to
help the Government find places which will be congenial to Government, to the employers, and
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to the boys.” 59 This effort was one of the rare instances in which the interests of the government
and the church coincided nearly perfectly. Furloughed conscientious objectors technically
remained in the military but they were now under civilian oversight. The military was relieved of
uncooperative conscripts who were more a determent than an asset, and the conscientious
objectors returned to productive agricultural work.
Most of the plain Mennonite conscientious objectors had been employed in agriculture
before the war, many worked their own farms or on their parent’s farms. Most desired to be
furloughed to their homes, but government policy called for furloughing the men at least 50
miles from their local draft boards. While many Mennonites viewed this 50 mile restriction as a
final, and petty, form of punishment, Loucks and other church leaders recognized it as a prudent
precaution given public opinion, and firmly supported this requirement. In a letter to Joseph A.
Yoder of Topeka, Indiana dated June 27, 1918, Loucks describe the requirement that men not be
furloughed within 50 miles of their home as “wise” noting that “some who have been sent home
are in danger of losing their lives because of the ill feeling in the community, caused by their
return.” 60
Numerous factors had to be considered before approving a furlough, and the church and
the government had slightly different priorities, but essentially their goals were compatible. The
government raised no objection to the men being furloughed to the custody of other Mennonite
farmers and although it was not expressly forbidden, Loucks felt that “It is best to avoid going to
relatives.” 61 Loucks’ most important concern was that the men be sent to work for farmers that
“are of the same church, or at least are sympathetic” otherwise he worried there was “likely to be
trouble for all concerned.” 62 The furlough application process demonstrated that the differences
between the plain Mennonites and the government could be reconciled, and a solution that was
satisfactory to both parties was possible.
The U.S. was involved in the First World War for just nineteen months, during which
time 503 conscientious objectors were court-martialed for refusing to accept even noncombatant
service. These 503 conscientious objectors represented a wide variety of religious groups as well
as political and secular objectors, however, the largest single group, 138 in all, were Mennonites.
Although the government did not differentiate between progressive and plain groups, it is clear
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that the vast majority of these were plain Mennonites. 63
Despite the fact that 138 Mennonites were convicted and sentenced to Leavenworth
Prison for an average of nearly twenty-years, Loucks and the Mennonite Church remained
surprisingly reluctant to criticize the government. A June 27, 1918 letter to J.H. and Ira Eigsti
predicted that “testing times are ahead, both for the boys and for those at home.” It noted that
“experience has shown that those who stand true to their convictions get thru the best.” The letter
argued that the “government wants to know who is true and who is trying to slip thru unjustly,
and it has a right to know.” It suggested that “it is advisable to take a stand but not to be
obstinate.” It agreed that those “whose attitude in camp is defiant” give good reason for courtmartial. It pointed out that even a court-martial “will be reviewed by officers ‘higher up’ before
they can be carried out.” The letter concluded by nothing that “there is very little danger for
those who are true.” 64 This attitude might at first appear naïve. However, Loucks was not
suggesting that the conscientious objector would avoid court marital or a conviction—these they
accepted as the likely consequence of their stand, but instead he reminded them to put their faith
in God and trust that their faith would ultimately see them through.
Public opinion became somewhat more sympathetic to the imprisoned conscientious
objectors after the war, and the War Department was criticized for the harsh treatment that the
conscientious objectors were subjected to, though much of the criticism came from the secular
press and the non-religious civil liberty organizations. The Secretary of War reviewed the courtmartial cases after the war and reduced or commuted most of the sentences. In January 1919, he
ordered the remaining religious objectors released and discharged from the army. A special
discharge was created, neither honorable nor dishonorable, for those imprisoned as well as those
who had accepted farm furloughs. This special discharge was printed on a distinctive blue paper
and stated that the discharged had done no work while in the army. 65
Public opinion toward conscientious objectors may have softened after the war, but the
attitude of most military officers toward the Mennonites remained largely unchanged. A report
on Mennonites prepared by Military Intelligence during the war noted that “the spirit of loyalty
and patriotism is entirely lacking in these people, killed by the narrow prejudices and
environments in which they have been brought up since their first settlement in this country.” 66
A second report on Mennonites, also prepared by Military Intelligence acknowledged that
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ordinarily the Mennonite “is an unobtrusive, bewiskered person, who yields obedience to the
laws, so long as the laws do not conflict with his religious belief.” This assessment was widely
shared by most observers who were familiar with the Mennonites, and were inclined to be
somewhat sympathetic to them and their religious objections. The report noted a somewhat
nuanced difference in attitudes based upon generations with the older members and elders being
“rock ribbed in their obstinacy” whereas the younger ones were more “disposed to cut loose
from the narrow prejudices that circumscribe them,” even going so far as being willing to “buy
bonds and aid in many war activities.” There certainly were differences in the attitudes of various
Mennonite groups on issues such as nonresistance, noncombatant military service, and the
willingness to subscribe to war bonds, but it is likely that the officer who compiled this report
inaccurately attributed these differences to generational differences when in reality they were due
to the different attitudes of the progressive and plain groups. The report included a concise but
accurate statement that “as farmers, the Mennonites are 100% efficient- as militants, 100%
deficient.” 67
In a somewhat counterintuitive way, conscription during the First World War seems to
have strengthened the Mennonite Church. Many draft age men seriously contemplated, often for
the first time in their lives, the reality that their religious beliefs and the expectations of them as
citizens of the United States might not always be in perfect harmony. The looming possibility of
conscription encouraged many, who during times of peace might have postponed baptism and
full membership in the church, to seek that membership as soon as they were eligible.
Conscription defined a generation of young men and produced its fair share of martyrs, but they
found strength in the company of other conscientious objectors. Many formed enduring
friendships with others who endured similar trials. The young Mennonite men who kept diaries,
or later recorded their experience in memoirs, almost invariably reported that whatever suffering
they endured because of their nonresistant stand ultimately strengthened their faith.

Endnote
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